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instances of upward reporting by cadres during the height of the terror, but
not many. 
5. Peasant survival methods. Some ate tree bark and grass; other con-
sumed “immortal earth” (D-88). Still others sold children. Quite a few fled;
some young women turned to prostitution. Others turned to spirit mediums
and faith healers: “If you want food to eat, you should follow spirits, not
cadres” (D-68). Cannibalism was the most extreme survival tactic. The book
contains cases from Gansu, Sichuan, and Guizhou. In one Gansu municipal-
ity, 41 such cases were found as of March 1961. The list of culprits, stratified
by class, reports “survival” as the reason for eating human flesh (D-26).
Collective actions included widespread food riots. A striking and perhaps
politically motivated incident took place in 1961, when 20-30 peasants in-
vaded a county Party compound in Changshou, Sichuan, “peeled the bark
off all the trees and consumed it” (D-88). Between September 1960 and
late January 1961, 30,000 incidents of train robberies by “groups” in 23
provinces were reported to the Ministry of Public Security (D-83). There
were acts of resistance to the levelling of graves and careless exposure of
bodies, part of a “war on the dead” (D-47). Revolts of unspecified size were
reported from Hunan, Guangxi, and Jiangxi involving secret societies and
clustering around December 1958 (D-62). Bitter satires about life in the
communes were posted in a variety of places. 
In early 1959, some villagers in a Shandong commune wanted to go to
Beijing. “They want Chairman Mao and the Party to seek revenge for them”
(D-108). Conversely, in 1961, “Down with Mao” posters were found in a
commune in Ningxiang County, Hunan. But rumours also circulated that
Mao had appointed Peng Dehuai, purged in 1959 for criticising the Leap, to
the governorship of Hunan (D-113). 
Harsh denunciations of Mao came from Xinchang, a Tibetan prefecture in
Sichuan in early 1959. In one township it was said that “Chairman Mao is
more brutal than Deng Xiuting,” a former-warlord. “We are treated worse
than slaves.” Ethnic groups can organise “to wreck this so-called people’s
government.” Han cadres are worse than indigenous ones. “When it comes
to grain procurement, the people’s government is much more brutal than
former slave owners.” But only “very small” counterrevolutionary organisa-
tions were formed (D-111). 
A truly subversive act was a letter written by two Youth League members
from Nanjing and mailed to various Party committees in early 1962. It was
a wholesale indictment of the disasters caused by communisation. The letter
appealed to the Centre to “discard dogma” and abandon the whole enter-
prise. Rather naively, the authors suggested that China advise other com-
munist countries to avoid this kind of disaster. Recipient officials were
ordered to destroy the letter (D-110).
Finally, the chapter on “Devastation in the countryside” sheds further light
on the immense damage done during the Leap to agriculture, forests, water
resources, and peasant housing, etc. Hu Yaobang, then head of the Youth
League, spent 25 days travelling through Hunan and Anhui in the fall of
1961. He commented: “Unless one sees the situation with one’s own eyes,
it’s impossible to believe how awful it is” (D-42). 
In sum, while this book raises questions of balance, it is nonetheless a
highly informative collection of original documents. 
z Thomas P. Bernstein is Professor emeritus of Political Science at
Columbia University, New York (tpb1@columbia.edu).
LEÏLA  CHOUKROUNE
With 54 countries, a land size of 30.2 million km² and a populationof about one billion, (1) Africa is far from being a homogenous en-tity. Favourite backyard of the colonial powers, this fictional con-
struction of Africa has always been the object of a multitude of attentions
and fantasies. These many hopes and fears have recently taken a new di-
mension as another giant has strategically penetrated the African territory,
giving rise to numerous concerns and comments. Since the 2006 Beijing
summit and publication of the first comprehensive Chinese White Paper on
China’s African Policy, China’s presence in Africa is indeed being scrutinised
by many observers from policy makers to businesses and academics. While
this “strategic partnership” is not always welcomed and envisaged as the
“win-win cooperation” advertised by Hu Jintao in his 2006 Beijing address,
some analysts deliberately take the opposite side to deconstruct myth and
discourse and tell “the real story” from proven facts.
Among the many academic publications released in the past few years, I
have chosen to present a group of three books, either individual or collective,
which give a good account of the main issues arising from China’s renewed
engagement in Africa. In reviewing these books, this essay also proposes to
reflect upon the many ways to approach this complicated question from a
multidisciplinary perspective as well as the role Africa could play in China
scholarship.
Let us start with a simple fact that sheds some light on an often
heated but not always well-documented debate: China’s presence in
Africa is hardly new. In China in Africa: A Century of Engagement, David
H. Shinn (former US ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso and ad-
junct Professor in international affairs at George Washington University)
and Joshua Eisenman (Senior Fellow in China Studies at the American
Foreign Policy Council) provide us with an excellent historical overview
of China-Africa relations. Cleopatra herself was probably wearing Chinese
silk, and the first trade relations could be dated from the Han Dynasty.
According to a number of authors, however, it is with the fifteenth cen-
tury naval expedition of Zheng He, a Chinese Muslim eunuch in the
court of Ming dynasty Emperor Yongle, that China-Africa relations
reached a significant level in a number of eastern African territories cor-
responding to the present Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania. This promising
pacific encounter did not last for long, since Emperor Chengzu prohibited
the construction of new ships for overseas expeditions in 1436 (Shinn
and Eisenman, p. 17; Snow, 1988). But for today’s Chinese leaders Zheng
He remains the initial model of a “non-threatening” “going out policy”
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1. Compared with 9.6 million km² for China with a population of 1.3 billion. 
Robert I. Rotberg (ed.),
China into Africa: Trade, Aid and
Influence, Washington D.C., 
Brookings Institution Press, 2008, 
350 pp.
geographical or topical perspective (China and Sahel, China and Southern
Africa, the Media), China in Africa: A Century of Engagement provides the
reader with a pleasant read and a detailed scientific approach to the China-
Africa debate in relation to previous China-Africa scholarship. Departing
from purely optimistic or alarmist views on an imperial China re-colonising
Africa, Shinn and Eisenman have managed to methodically review a number
of very diverse issues from a comparative perspective, resulting in one of
the most accurate and balanced publications on China-Africa relations. 
This academic detachment is far from being the rule in most Sinological
or Africanist productions on the China-Africa issue. In her controversial yet
influential book Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is a Better
Way for Africa (2010), Dambisa Moyo, a former Goldman Sachs investment
banker from Zambia, scorns Western aid as a curse and an agent of corrup-
tion while praising China’s unconditional engagement and the many merits
of a “Beijing consensus,” popularised by Joshua Cooper Ramo, and bringing
growth on the basis of the Chinese development model. (3) This critical en-
terprise based on the deconstruction of presumably false assumptions with
systematic fact-finding is somehow shared – although in a less provocative
and much more rigorous manner – by Deborah Brautigam, who in her well-
advertised and reviewed Dragon’s Gift aims to reveal the real story of China
in Africa. (4) As a long-time observer of the Sino-African relationship, and now
Professor and Director of the International Development Program of the
Johns Hopkins University, Deborah Brautigam has carried out extensive
fieldwork in Africa and gained access to first-hand materials in many coun-
tries. She is absolutely right to try to demystify a number of expressly sen-
sationalist and unverified news items published worldwide, including by
influential media such as The Economist or The Atlantic or academics quot-
ing the same news, on how China is grabbing land, polluting territories, or
exploiting African workers. This courageous and much-needed attempt is
exemplified by her fascinating piece on “Chinese Engagement in African
Agriculture: Fiction and Fact,” in which she takes a number of examples of
poor media investigation and scholarship that mix rumour with fact and
confuse currencies and countries to systematically raise feelings of anxiety
over how and where China is now operating to “grab” land. (5) And yes, fears
as well as the possible ancestor of some African-Chinese (Shinn and
Eisenman, p. 17). (2)
Later on, China-Africa relations were limited to some movement of labour-
ers and merchants to Mauritius, Madagascar, or South Africa, and one had
to wait for the Republican era and, more importantly, the Chinese Commu-
nist revolution, to observe the birth and development of a new type of en-
gagement, that of a non-aligned People’s Republic of China promoting
peaceful cooperation while deconstructing Taiwan’s ties with the continent.
According to David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, from the early 1950s to
mid-1970s, “China’s Africa policy had three primary objectives: breaking out
of international isolation, battling the former Soviet Union for primacy in
the world communist movement, and displacing Taiwan as the internation-
ally recognized government of China” (Shinn and Eisenman, p. xi). To reach
these goals, China strategically cooperated with national liberation move-
ments in seeking newly independent African countries to support its re-
sumption of membership in the United Nations. From 1964 onward, Beijing
developed its now famous “Eight Principles on Economic and Technical Aid”
to which no condition of reciprocity or conditionality was attached: “The
Chinese Government never asks for any privilege or attaches any condi-
tions” (Ibid., p. xi). The flagship project of this post-colonial period was of
course the now quasi-mythical Tanzania-Zambia railway inaugurated in
1975 between two countries that sympathised with the socialist revolu-
tionary objectives and rhetoric. 
From the 1980s, with the opening-up and the transformation of China’s
economy, Sino-African relations took a new turn towards a business-ori-
ented partnership, with Africa offering both a market for China’s manufac-
tured products and a strategic target for investment in resources. During
the same period, Chinese military assistance to Africa grew and diversified
into a significant participation in UN peacekeeping missions or more direct
supply operations with military equipment and training. From the early
2000s, the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) concretised these new relations by offering a diplomatic window
to a fast-evolving partnership culminating in the newly adopted “Beijing
Action Plan for Africa (2013-2015),” which gives a very precise overview of
Sino-African ambitions in a variety of domains from economic cooperation
to cultural exchanges and the promotion of peace and security. 
All these developments, as well as their inscription in a given historical
continuity, illustrate the growth and changing nature of China’s international
ambitions and regional presence. This particular attention paid to the history
of China’s re-engagement in Africa is perceptible throughout Shinn and
Eisenman well-structured book. With 12 chapters covering mostly the post-
1949 period and dealing with both general (historical overview, trade, in-
vestment, and assistance, military relations) and precise issues from a
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2. Indeed, in 2005, a Kenyan girl of possible Chinese descent was invited to visit her ancestors’ coun-
try. See “Kenyan Girl Traces Chinese Roots over 600 Years Later,” Chinese Embassy in Kenya, avail-
able at: www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceke/eng/sbgx/t204436.htm (accessed on 14 January 2013). 
3. See Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa,
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010, note 22. See as well from the same author, Winner Take All: China’s
Race for Resources and What it Means for the World, Basic Books, 2012.
4. See as well her blog: www.chinaafricarealstory.com (accessed on 14 January 2013). 
5. See Deborah Brautigam, “Chinese Engagement in African Agriculture: Fiction and Fact,” in John
Anthony Allan, Martin Keulertz, Suvi Sojamo, Jeroen Warner (eds.), Handbook of Land and Water
Grabs in Africa, Routledge, 2012, pp. 91-103.
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about China are “misinformed” and used by other powers with the indirect
complicity of non-vigilant media looking for more China bashing. But re-
gardless of its international success and defendable objectives, the Dragon’s
Gift does not bring as much clarity as it could to the China-Africa “real
story.” Filled with hundreds of loosely-structured anecdotes and many in-
teresting facts, the book is a sort of patchwork of 11 chapters with a mul-
titude of catchy titles in which the “crouching tiger” competes with the
“orient express”! Nevertheless, timely and the first of its kind, the Dragon’s
Gift reaches some of its objectives in publicising the debate beyond spe-
cialised academic and media circles. Deborah Brautigam’s blog and publi-
cations are useful reads for all those who are interested not only in learning
more about China in Africa, but also in understanding China as a global actor
as well as related pressing contemporary issues in international relations. 
Trade and investment flows are of course at the centre of these new con-
cerns. In 2009, China became Africa’s top trading partner. In 2010, outward
foreign direct investment (FDI) from emerging economies accounted for
29% of global FDI outflows. Six developing and transitional economies were
among the 20 top world investors. In this group, China occupied the second
position globally, and for the first time surpassed Japan in outward FDI
(OFDI) and accounted for 30% of the total number of cross-border mergers
and acquisitions. (6) A number of these new FDIs have been made in Africa.
How much and how? This is difficult to say, as China, despite recent efforts
from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), does not publish clear
and systemic statistics on the topic – but then, neither do other main play-
ers such as the US who are very much involved in sensitive businesses
throughout the continent. In 2007, Africa Silk Road, a report edited by Harry
G. Broadman for the World Bank, was already highlighting China’s and India’s
new economic frontier in presenting the performances and patterns of Chi-
nese and Indian trade and investment flows with Africa at an original micro
(firm) level. China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, edited by Robert I.
Rotberg in 2008, follows this path from a more general angle and provides
us with 14 insightful chapters, including a number of specialised contribu-
tions on “Chinese concessional loans” (Paul Hubbard), “Trade and invest-
ment” (Harry G. Broadman), and “Aid” (Deborah Brautigam). The chapter by
Harry Broadman (author of the Africa Silk Road) is particularly interesting
as it insists on what is probably the most crucial transformation of today’s
international economic relations: the surge and possible future dominance
of south-south trade and investment flows, which not only challenge the
current balance of powers, but also the principles and rules on which these
exchanges are based. In this regard, it will be fascinating to observe the next
evolution of China’s participation in the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
and its further engagement with the Dispute Settlement System (DSB) in
relation not only to developed countries but also to other developing coun-
tries in Africa and Latin America that now represent a large share in Chinese
trade. 
What about aid, then? Is China the unconditional friend portrayed by
African Sinophiles? And what about debt sustainability, governance, and en-
vironmental issues while money is supposedly massively injected in non-
democratic regimes such as Zimbabwe that are portrayed as enemies of
the West? Contrary to the proliferating clichés and media stories, Chinese
aid can take a multitude of forms, from the preferential loans offered by
China Eximbank to infrastructure building projects, and takes place through-
out Africa, even in countries that are less rich in resources. The 2006 and
2010 White Papers were already quite clear about the explicit and implicit
objectives of this aid policy. Sceptics will be convinced by the latest publi-
cations of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and recent news
on the possibly imminent establishment of a BRICS development bank,
which could provide an unprecedented alternative to the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
In this peaceful yet planned conquest of African territory, another aspect
of Chinese engagement plays a major role: the penetration and diffusion of
Chinese culture through media coverage and the development of educa-
tional ties. China is setting up dozens of Confucius Institutes, and in July
2012, the Chinese government announced a three-year “African Talents
Plan” aimed at training around 30,000 Africans and giving out 18,000 schol-
arships. Any traveller to Africa will notice the presence of these Confucius
Institutes, which are now often bigger and better funded than many of the
cultural institutes of former colonisers. 
Very importantly as well, China has been making significant strides in ex-
panding its media presence on the continent. In January 2012, CCTV chose
Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, to set up a broadcast hub, and Xinhua now
has 20 bureaus on the continent. (7) Knowing the ability of China to use and
transform its propaganda apparatus, this carefully thought-out media cam-
paign will certainly have an impact on the African narrative and the role
China plays in the scenarios to come. In this regard, one can only agree with
Yu Shan Wu’s observations in his 2012 Report for the South African Institute
of International Affairs: “China has sent its state media on a global mission
to advance its influence in the world, signalling an addition to China’s out-
ward movement project, which previously focused on trade, investment and
diplomatic activities. In particular, China’s state media in Africa provide in-
sight into China’s larger soft power strategy. At this particular juncture, China
is giving Africa something that other media infrastructure sources are not:
the capacity to create its own content and an alternative platform to tell
Africa’s own story and to view China’s story” (Yu, p. 24). 
Sinology is dead, long live Sinology! This surprising remark intentionally
formulated in a dedicated first-class China academic journal is not only
provocative, but also aims at reconsidering the evolution of Chinese power
and with it the necessary transformation of social sciences studies on China.
While many books have recently been published on China-Africa relations,
these have often been released by media correspondents or diplomats with
long-time experience in Africa and/or China. Specialised academic books
are harder to find. This not only calls for a “going out” scholarship on China,
but also for a more precise thematic approach (economic, legal, political,
etc.) toward socio-economic realties that are not China-specific, but rather
global. This “careful scholarship” (8) based on original fieldwork and – but not
only – a genuine knowledge of China could bring an immense contribution
to many Chinese and social sciences studies in building bridges between
“Sinology” and other disciplines in which interest in China is immense but
not always filled with adequate knowledge. 
z Leïla Choukroune is Senior Lecturer in International Economic Law,
Deputy Director of the Institute for Globalisation and International
Regulation (IGIR), Maastricht University Law Faculty
(leila.choukroune@maastrichtuniversity.nl).
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